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There is no question that the Supreme Court's June 2015 rul-
ing in Obergefell v. Hodges,' in which it declared a constitutional
right to marry a person of the same sex, changed the landscape of
marriage law dramatically. The patchwork of laws either embrac-
ing or prohibiting such marriages had become increasingly hard to
reconcile as couples moved or traveled from one state to the next
and faced uncertainty about their marital status.2
With a single wave of its constitutional wand, the Supreme
Court ended those conflicts. In two simple sentences, the Court
ended a decades-long controversy over the right of same-sex
couples to marry.
The Constitution. . . does not permit the State to bar same-sex
couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples
of the opposite sex.... [T]he Court also must hold-and it now
does hold-that there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to
recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another
State on the ground of its same-sex character.3
The simplicity of these statements belies the complexity of the na-
tional landscape at that time. States were stridently split between
allowing same-sex couples to marry and prohibiting both the cele-
bration and recognition of marriages by same-sex couples.4
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IObergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2 There is extensive literature on this point. By way of example, see Tobias Barrington
Wolff, Interest Analysis in Interjurisdictional Marriage Disputes, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2215 (2005);
ANDREW KOPILMAN, SAME SEX, DIn.EERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES CROSS
STAIT LINES 17 (2006); Joseph William Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the
Evasion of Obligation, 1 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 1 (2005); Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Com-
ity: Revisiting the-Problem of Non-Uniform Marriage Laws, 84 OR. L. REv. 433 (2005).
3 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607-608. The Court inched towards this ruling in 2013, with its
ruling in Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), in which it invalidated the federal
Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") on equal protection grounds.
4 See Danielle Kurtzleben, Map: Here's How Same-Sex Marriage Laws Will Now Change
Nationwide, NPR (June 26, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/06/26/4177151
24/map-heres-how-same-sex-marriage-laws-will-now-change-nationwide.
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Now, same-sex married couples can marry anywhere-and,
importantly, divorce anywhere.5 And wherever they go, they are
just as married as any other married couple. But what about the
status of children of same-sex couples? The growing number of
children being raised by same-sex couples and their relegation
"through no fault of their own to a more difficult and uncertain
family life" played a key role in Justice Kennedy's reasoning in the
majority opinion in Obergefell.6 But the ability of any particular
child's parents to marry is only the most obvious way in which
Obergefell affects children. It also has potentially far reaching im-
plications for parentage law-the statutes and doctrines that tell us
who a child's legal parents are. Obergefell resolved some thorny
parentage law issues, but left others unresolved and made still
others more confused. This uneven impact reveals an underlying
incoherence of parentage law that goes far beyond the questions
raised by married, same-sex couples with children.
Dramatic changes in the family form over the last several de-
cades have put increasing pressure on the parent-child relationship.
This elevation of the parent-child relationship in law and policy
means that parents have both greater rights and more onerous ob-
ligations than in a system that spreads responsibility for children
more broadly. The question of what constitutes a legal parent-
child relationship under American law has become increasingly im-
portant because of its primacy in the determination of rights and
obligations, but also increasingly complex because of reproductive
technology and changing patterns of childbearing. The complexity
and lack of cohesion that characterizes modern parentage law is a
reflection of the past. Or, perhaps more accurately, it reflects the
law's attempt to preserve the legal traditions of the past despite
oceanic changes in society and in family form. Courts and legisla-
tures have tried to reason by analogy when developing parentage
rules for modern families. But the vast differences between the
traditional family-a heterosexual, married couple who conceived
children only through sex-and the myriad types of new American
families strain the analogy. Can parentage rules that turned exclu-
5 Marriage does not require residency, but divorce does. This difference has meant that
many same-sex couples that left home to marry or enter civil unions were then unable to dissolve
those relationships anywhere. See, e.g., In re Marriage of J.B. and H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654 (Tex.
App. 2010) (refusing to grant divorce to gay couple that married in Massachusetts before moving
to Texas).
6 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600. The Court cited and relied on research from the Williams
Institute, an LGBT policy group at UCLA. Id.
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2807197 
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sively on marriage or biological ties find use in situations involving
neither?
This essay will explore the origins of parentage law, the ques-
tions raised by modern families, and the impact of the Obergefell
ruling. When we remove gender from questions of parentage,
what remains?
II. THE ORIGINS OF PARENTAGE LAW
Joan and Peter Stanley raised three children together and co-
habited on and off for almost two decades, but they never mar-
ried.7 When Joan died in the late 1960s, the children were made
wards of the state and placed with a court-appointed guardian.8
Peter, though he was the biological and social/psychological father
of the children, and supported them throughout their lives, was
given no rights as a legal parent under Illinois law.9 In fact, the law
did not include him in the definition of parent at all:
'Parents' means the father and mother of a legitimate child, or
the survivor of them, or the natural mother of an illegitimate
child, and includes any adoptive parent. It does not include a
parent whose rights in respect of the minor have been termi-
nated in any manner provided by law.' °
Because Peter was not considered a "parent," his children's fate
upon the death of their mother-and only legal parent-was gov-
erned by another provision, which rendered them "dependent" on
the state because they were "without a parent, guardian, or legal
custodian."" He could have petitioned to be their custodian or
guardian but, even if appointed, he would not have been consid-
ered their "parent," with all the rights and obligations that come
with that status.
The Illinois law that denied legal parent status to Peter Stanley
was not unique. Quite the contrary. It was typical in an era when
parentage and legitimacy were inextricably linked. For legitimate
7 In re Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814, 814 (I1. 1970).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 II.i. Rr;v. STAT. ch. 37, para. 701-14 (1967) (current version at 705 IL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
405/1-3 (West 2015) (removing the word legitimate)). The provisions applicable to this case are
cited and discussed in the opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court. See Stanley, 256 N.E.2d at 815.
11 h.r. Ri;v. STAT. ch. 37, para. 702-05 (1967) (current version at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
405/2-4 (West 2015)).
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children, the mother's husband was presumed, often conclusively,
to be the legal father.'2 Marital status of the mother thus deter-
mined paternal parentage of the child.13
For illegitimate children, marital status often determined (or
precluded) parentage as well. Although American law never took
as harsh an approach to the status of illegitimate children as En-
glish law, most state laws differentiated between legitimate and il-
legitimate children when defining the parent-child relationship. 4
Into the nineteenth century, a child born out of wedlock was filius
nullius-the child of nobody.' 5 But this rule was often overlooked
to allow ties between illegitimate children and their mothers and
her kin. The formal rule gave way by the end of the nineteenth
century to a less harsh rule that rendered them, by law, children of
their mothers, but not their fathers.' 6 Like the 1967 version of the
Illinois Juvenile Court Act, most state statutes in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries defined "parent" to include
both mother and father in the case of legitimate children, but only
the mother in the case of illegitimate children. And for "legiti-
mate" children who were actually fathered by someone other than
the mother's husband, their biological fathers did not have legal
parent status either.
Parentage and legitimacy were tied for obvious reasons. For
the most part, children of married parents were, in fact, biologically
tied both to the mother and her husband. Although conclusive
presumptions always invite error, most husbands were the biologi-
cal fathers of their wives' children. So this presumption dictated
the right conclusion in the vast majority of cases.17 And when an-
other man was the father, there was a sordid, and maybe illegal,
12 See LESLIE HARRIS FT AL., FAMILY LAW 887 (4th ed. 2010) (stating that in England, a
husband was conclusively presumed to be the father of his wife's children, unless he had been
out of the kingdom for more than nine months).
13 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120 (1989) (describing and upholding conclu-
sive marital presumption of paternity).
14 See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: TIHE His-
TORY O1 CHIL) CUSTODY IN TI UNITED STATES (1994).
15 See id. at 24.
16 On this history, see John Witte, Jr., Ishmael's Bane: The Sin and Crime of Illegitimacy
Reconsidered, 5 PUNISHME, r & Soc'Y: Tin. INT'L J. PENOLOGY 327, 329-30 (2003).
17 See Chris W. Altenbernd, Quasi-Marital Children: The Common Law's Failure in Privette
and Daniel Calls for Statutory Reform, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 219, 227-28 (1999) (citing a 1940s
study that found ten percent of children born to married women were conceived in adultery).
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tale that was best left unrevealed.1 s The father was not likely to
provide support, and allowing him to be identified would simply
stigmatize mother and child, as well as the mother's cuckolded hus-
band.19 Moreover, given the limitations of scientific knowledge,
the real father could never be known for sure, and the cost of ask-
ing an unanswerable question might be the stability of the intact
family unit.20
Although they had little if any access to parental rights, fathers
of out-of-wedlock children were sometimes responsible for support
of their children. Laws specifically obligating unwed fathers to
support their illegitimate children were among the first to formal-
ize the obligation of both parents to support their children (now
reflected, among other places, in strict gender-neutral and mar-
riage-neutral child support laws). As states began to formalize the
obligation of parents to support their children, many specifically
obligated fathers to support illegitimate children. By the 1930s,
every state had both a civil and criminal law requiring support for
children.2 ' Although these laws varied from state to state, a num-
ber of them expressly required fathers to support their out-of-wed-
lock children.22 Unwed mothers or local prosecutors could
institute "bastardy" proceedings to prove paternity and obtain
child support.23
This bifurcation of rights and obligations for unwed fathers
was the subject of several challenges in the 1970s. In Stanley v.
Illinois, the case challenging Illinois's refusal to recognize Peter
Stanley as the legal father of his biological children, the U.S. Su-
preme Court concluded that the law excluding unwed fathers from
the definition of "parent" violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 24 The Court relied first on the well-estab-
lished principle that the right to "conceive and to raise one's chil-
18 On the law's confinement of legitimate sex to marriage, see, in general, JOANNA L. GROSS-
MAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSII)E TIE CASTLE: LAW AND TiHEq FAMILY IN 20TH CinrURY
AMERICA (2011).
19 Id.
20 Courts sometimes ignored even incontrovertible scientific evidence when applying the
marital presumption. See, e.g., Prochnow v. Prochnow, 80 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Wis. 1957) (uphold-
ing the trial court's ruling that the husband was the father despite blood-type evidence that
excluded him as a possible father).
21 CHESTER G. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS, VOLUME IV: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF TIlE FAMILY LAW OF THE FORTY-EIGir AMERICAN STATES, AI.ASKA, rin DISTRICT OF CO-
LUMBIA, ANI) HAWAII (TO JAN. 1, 1935) at 5 (1936).
22 See id.
23 See id.
24 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 648 (1972).
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dren" is "essential. "25 Constitutional protection for parental rights
had been established in a trilogy of cases in the early twentieth
century, establishing a protective sphere for parental decision-mak-
ing. In a modern case, Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court
reminded states of this protection by invalidating a third-party visi-
tation statute that did not give enough weight to the preferences of
a fit parent.27 Troxel operates as a counterweight to efforts to rec-
ognize non-biological parents, as the recognition of an additional
parent necessarily dilutes the existing parent's rights.
With respect to unwed fathers, the Court concluded in Stanley
that the categorical rule of non-recognition actually undermined
the state's identified interests.2 8 It aimed to protect "the moral,
emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best
interests of the community" and to "strengthen the minor's family
ties whenever possible. ' 29 Yet, children were callously removed
from custodial, biological fathers based solely on marital status. As
the Court observed in Stanley, "the State registers no gain towards
its declared goals when it separates children from the custody of fit
parents. Indeed, if Stanley is a fit father, the State spites its own
articulated goals when it needlessly separates him from his fam-
ily."' 30 Thus, even if the state was right that "most unmarried fa-
thers are unsuitable and neglectful parents," some of them are
"wholly suited to have custody of their children. '31 Peter Stanley,
in the Court's view, was entitled to an opportunity to make his case
as a father deserving of custody.32 As states had tried to do in
other contexts, Illinois was relying on an irrebuttable presumption,
which was "cheaper and easier than individualized determination,"
but which came at the expense of individuals' due process rights.33
But the Court rejected this approach, concluding that it "needlessly
25 Id. at 651 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
26 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating state law banning instruction in
any foreign language before ninth grade); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invali-
dating an Oregon law requiring children between ages eight and sixteen to attend public school);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding conviction of child's aunt for allowing
her niece to sell religious pamphlets on the street in violation of state labor law).
27 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (invalidating Washington state law that allowed
"any person" at "any time" to petition for visitation with a child and permitted courts to grant
such requests based solely on the best interests of the child).
28 See Stanley, 405 U.S. 645.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 652-53.
31 Id. at 654.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 656-57.
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risks running roughshod over the important interests of both par-
ent and child."34 The Court thus struck down the categorical denial
to unwed fathers of legal parent status.
Stanley effected the first big deviation from the traditional
rules of parentage by allowing for the possibility that a biological
father could have parental rights without being married to the
child's mother. This proposition was important then, as rates of
non-marital cohabitation and non-marital child bearing were be-
ginning to be palpable. And it became more important as those
rates began to rise dramatically. Only 1.8% of children born in
1915 were likely illegitimate, and only 3% in 1940.36 And, in most
of the cases, the births (and the real fathers) were concealed from
the public. By the 1980s, however, cohabitation and unmarried
coparenting were definitely out of the closet: in 1985, 22% of all
children were born to unmarried mothers; in 1997, 32%; and by
2008, 40.3% .31 The rate for children of African-American mothers,
in 2015, was over 70%.38
A series of cases after Stanley considered the contours of pa-
rental rights for unwed fathers, especially for those who had not
lived with their children or otherwise acted like a parent. Recog-
nizing their differing roles in reproduction and the special difficulty
of identifying a child's biological father, the Court declined to man-
date identical treatment of unwed mothers and unwed fathers. A
woman who gives birth is presumed to be the legal mother, unless
the birth is subject to an enforceable surrogacy contract. But for
men, the genetic tie only gives rise to the opportunity to be a par-
ent-an opportunity that can be grasped or forfeited by the man's
conduct during the woman's pregnancy or towards the child after
birth.39 If he fails to grasp that opportunity, the Constitution will
34 Stanley, 405 U.S. 645.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 See Brady E. Hamilton et al., Births: Preliminary Data for 2014, 64 NAT'L VrrAL STAT.
Ri P. 6, 13 tbl. 6 (June 17, 2015).
38 Id. at 13, tbl. 6.
39 See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (upholding New York's putative father registry
as sufficient protection for the parental rights of unwed fathers); see also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246 (1978) (upholding provision of Georgia code that denied an unwed father the right to
veto a proposed adoption because father had failed to legitimate child through available statu-
tory procedure); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (invalidating New York law that
gave unmarried mothers but not unmarried fathers the right to veto an adoption); see also
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (finding that that California's refusal to permit
putative fathers to contest the paternity of children born during their mother's marriage to an-
other did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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not "automatically compel a state to listen to his opinion of where
the child's best interests lie."4 0  This standard can produce harsh
results for men who hesitate to assert their parental rights, and
even, sometimes, for those who are thwarted in their efforts to es-
tablish a relationship. 41 But as the family continued to morph-
Justice O'Connor aptly wrote in Troxel that the "demographic
changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average
American family" 42-parentage law faced new and, frankly,
greater challenges, which are addressed in the next section.
III. PARENTAGE LAW IN THE AGE OF THE
NEW AMERICAN FAMILY
Stanley spurred the first big change to the traditional rules of
parentage, necessitated by the Supreme Court's mandate that
states could not categorically deny the rights of unwed fathers.
Stanley and its progeny required a wholesale restructuring of state
parentage law to account for the constitutional parental rights-as
limited as they might be in any given case-of unwed fathers. In
response, states enacted new statutory schemes designed to ferret
out fathers and draw lines between those who had earned parental
rights and those who had not.43
It was thus against this backdrop that the Uniform Parentage
Act ("UPA") was adopted in 1973. Many states had parentage
laws that were rendered unconstitutional by one or more of the
Court's opinions on illegitimacy or unwed fathers' rights. As im-
portantly, those opinions both reflected and reinforced an emerg-
ing tolerance for new family forms. But with new families came
new questions about the legal ties between adults and children.
40 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
41 In re Adoption of B.Y., 356 P.3d 1215 (Utah 2015) (upholding adoption over objection of
biological father who had relied on mother's assurances that she would not place the child for
adoption if he did not initiate a paternity proceeding); see also Joanna L. Grossman, He Who
Hesitated Lost: Unwed Father in Utah Forfeits Parental Rights, Jus [IA'S VERDIcr (Sept. 2, 2015),
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/09/02/he-who-hesitated-lost-unwed-father-in-utah-forfeits-paren-
tal-rights.
42 Troxel, 530 U.S. 57, 63.
43 On the challenges in defining the rights of unwed fathers, see generally David D. Meyer,
Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless Father, 41 ARiZ. L. REv. 753
(1999); Laura Oren, Thwarted Fathers or Pop- Up Pops?: How to Determine When Putative Fa-
thers Can Block the Adoption of Their Newborn Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 153 (2006); see also
Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the Constitution of the Nonmarital Family, 103 CALI'. L.
Ruv. 1277 (2015).
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The focus of the 1973 UPA was to provide states with a coherent
set of rules governing parentage in a wider variety of situations
than covered by traditional statutes, which by and large treated
parentage and legitimacy as the same question. While mothers
were entitled to legal parent status solely as a function of giving
birth, legal fatherhood was determined by reference to a "network
of presumptions which cover cases in which proof of external cir-
cumstances (in the simplest case, marriage between the mother and
a man) indicate a particular man to be the probable father." 44 Sec-
tion 4 of the UPA provided that a man is presumed to be the natu-
ral father of a child if he is married to the child's mother, has
acknowledged paternity (which has not been disputed by the
mother), or he has received a minor child "into his home and
openly holds out the child as his natural child." 4
5
The UPA's relatively simple conception of legal fatherhood
actually involves two key moves away from the traditional model: a
weakening of the marital presumption such that a husband might
not always be deemed the legal father of his wife's children and the
creation of the possibility that an unwed biological father might
have rights and responsibilities. Eighteen states adopted the 1973
UPA in full or in substantial part.46 A handful of other states
adopted parentage statutes of their own that were similar in at least
some respects. But almost as quickly as this round of parentage
laws was adopted, they became outdated. The prevalence, use, and
nature of assisted reproduction changed dramatically in the decade
following the adoption of the original UPA. We saw greater use of
assisted reproduction in general, but also greater use of donated
sperm by single women, lesbian couples, and unmarried heterosex-
ual partners with male factor infertility. With those changes came
more difficult questions about where to draw the line between "do-
nor" and "potential father." And, eventually, questions arose
about whether the rules regarding paternity might also be applied
to female partners. The adoption of parentage statutes-abrogat-
ing what had largely been a common-law system of rules-finalized
a shift away from reliance on marital status as a proxy for biologi-
cal fatherhood and towards recognition, and protection, of both
burgeoning and full-fledged father-child relationships.
44 Prefatory Note, U.P.A. (1973).
45 U.P.A. § 4 (1973).
46 A small number of states adopted the 1973 UPA, but omitted the word "married" in the
sperm donor provision, generally without explanation. See, e.g., COLO. R,'v. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-
106(2) (West 2014); Or-no Riv. Com-, ANN. § 3111.95(B) (West 2015); Wvo. STA-r. ANN.
§ 14-2-103 (repealed 2003 and replaced with §§ 14-2-902 & 903).
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Since the 1970s, the family has moved several more steps away
from the traditional model-and into an almost dizzying array of
scenarios in which today's children might be born, involving unwed
parents, reproductive technology, same-sex couples, egg and sperm
donors, surrogate carriers, or some combination of these. The
UPA was revised in 2000, and amended again in 2002, largely to
deal with increasingly complicated uses of reproductive technol-
ogy. For example, the new version provides for the possibility that
an unmarried male partner could be deemed the legal father of a
child conceived by his partner with donor sperm.4 7 This set of
moves away from the marital family, however, have proved harder
to sort out because there has been no recognition of federal consti-
tutional rights for other would-be parents, no consensus about the
wisdom of denying or recognizing parentage in particular situa-
tions, and no theoretical basis for either choice. There is a virtual
consensus that biology and adoption are not the only bases of par-
entage, but no consensus on which other factors suffice, or what to
do when there is tension between different factors. Parentage by
intent, by agreement, and by function have all been recognized by
some states in some contexts, but there is no unified theory to
guide those choices or to be able to predict them.
Consider the following example: The Kansas Supreme Court
recently held that a lesbian co-parent must be treated as a legal
parent of her partner's child because the two women entered into
an enforceable agreement to share parental rights.4 8 But in a well-
known case working its way through the lower courts in Kansas,
the "Craigslist sperm donor" has been deemed a legal father of
children conceived with his donated sperm despite an agreement
between the donor, the biological mother, and her lesbian partner
that the two women would share parental rights and obligations
and that the donor would have neither.4 9 The agreement should be
valid for purposes of recognizing the lesbian co-parent's rights,
given the applicable precedent, but that would leave the child with
three legal parents. Yet, Kansas, like most states, has stuck to the
"rule of two," which limits each child to two legal parents. s It thus
becomes hard to reconcile these two cases.
47 U.P.A. § 703 (2000, amended 2002).
48 See Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542 (Kan. 2013).
49 See Steve Fry, Marotta is a Father, Not Merely a Sperm Donor, CJON INE.COM (Jan. 22,
2014), http://cjonline.com/news/2014-01-22/court-marotta-father-not-merely-sperm-donor.
SO Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. RiFV. 11 (2008). In
2014, California adopted the first statute to allow for more than two parents in certain cases. See
CAL. FAM. CODE §7612(c) (2014); see also Joanna L. Grossman, California Allows Children to
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It is in the cases involving at most one biological parent that
the parentage questions get interesting. When, and under what cir-
cumstances, do adults without a biological tie to children nonethe-
less have a claim to legal parentage? This question can be asked in
many settings, but the focus in this essay, and particularly the next
section, is the application of parentage rules to same-sex married
couples.
IV. PARENTAGE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIED COUPLES
As discussed in the Introduction, the Obergefell ruling re-
sulted in clear, bright-line rules regarding marriage for same-sex
couples: (1) same-sex couples can marry in any American state;51
(2) same-sex couples who do marry will be recognized as married
both horizontally-by other states-and vertically-by the federal
government; and (3) same-sex married couples can divorce or seek
annulments on the same terms as any other married couple.5
Less clear are the consequences for parentage law. How does
the right to marry affect the creation of parent-child relationships
in families anchored by a same-sex couple? Married heterosexual
couples also become parents in other ways-through adoption, sur-
rogacy, and gamete donation. The rules in those situations are ex-
plained below, as I discuss the impact of Obergefell in each
situation.
Same-sex couples, obviously, cannot produce a child that is ge-
netically related to both of them-nor only to them. Thus, ques-
tions of parentage are, right off the bat, more complicated for these
families. But does the ability to marry (and be treated as married
nationwide) resolve some of those complications? There is no uni-
form answer to that question; it varies by method of conception
and a variety of other factors.
Have More Than Two Legal Parents, JUSTIA'S VERDICT (Oct. 15, 2013), https://verdict.justia
.com/2013/10/15/california-allows-children-two-legal-parents.
51 Efforts by states or state officials to block the issuance of marriage licenses will not suc-
ceed, but they persist as a predictable form of backlash to a controversial ruling on a social issue.
See, e.g., John Mura & Richard Perez-Pena, Marriage Licenses Issued in Kentucky County, but
Debates Continue, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 4, 2015, at A12 (reporting on clerk who was jailed for
refusing to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples).
52 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Joanna L. Grossman, From Zero to Fifty
in Eleven Years: The Supreme Court Declares the Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry in
Obergefell v. Hodges, JUSTLA'S VERDICT (June 26, 2015), https://verdict.justia.com/2015/06/26/
from-zero-to-fifty-in-eleven-years.
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A. Adoption
Adoption can raise many legal issues, but this essay will focus
just on the two situations most likely to affect a same-sex couple.
First, when two people wish to jointly adopt a child that is not the
biological child of either, many states require them to be married.53
With nationwide access to marriage, same-sex couples can now sat-
isfy that prerequisite in every state. Only Mississippi has a sepa-
rate law barring two people of the same sex from jointly adopting a
child,54 though that law is currently being challenged.55
Second, when a person seeks to adopt the biological child of a
romantic partner, different rules apply. 56 Many states provide by
statute for adoption by a stepparent (as long as the child's other
legal parent is out of the picture-never recognized, rights termi-
nated, or dead).57 Without adoption, stepparents have neither
rights nor obligations toward their stepchildren, particularly after
the marriage that created the relationship dissolves. 8 Stepparent
adoption provisions allow the parent's spouse to adopt without sev-
ering the parent's rights (most adoptions substitute one parent-
child relationship for another) 59 and, typically, bypass some of the
steps in the adoption approval process, such as home visits.60 In
theory at least, the parent who married the would-be adoptive par-
ent has undertaken the state's usual screening role. With equal ac-
cess to marriage, same-sex spouses should be able to adopt in all
fifty states.
53 See, e.g., U rAIl CoO ANN. § 78B-6-117(3) (2008); Cynthia R. Mabry, Joint and Shared
Parenting: Valuing All Families and All Children in the Adoption Process with an Expanded
Notion of Family, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. Poi 'Y & L. 659, 661 (2009).
54 Miss. CooE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (2010).
55 See Tamar Lewin, Mississippi Ban on Adoptions by Same-Sex Couples is Challenged, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2015, at A9 (discussing a couple's challenge of the Mississippi law). The Move-
ment Advancement Project provides helpful tracking on these issues here. Foster and Adoption
Laws, MAP: MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PiPoJ-c'r, http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/fos
ter and adoptionjlaws (2015).
56 WILLIAM P. STATSKY, FAMIi Y LAW 560 (2013).
57 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-4-103 (1996) (authorizing stepparent adoption).
58 See, e.g., A.S. v. I.S., 2015 WL 9485233 (Pa. Dec. 29, 2015) (considering legal rules gov-
erning stepparent-stepchild relationships).
59 See generally Mark Strasser, Courts, Legislatures, and Second-Parent Adoptions: On Judi-
cial Deference, Specious Reasoning, and the Best Interests of the Child, 66 TENN. L. Ri'v. 1019,
1025-026 (1999); Thomas A. Jacobs, § 4:5 Stepparent, 1 CIrLD. & L.: RTs & OBLIGATrIONS § 4:5
(2015).
60 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10A-11 (2015) ("When the person sought to be adopted is an
adult, only the sworn, written consent of the adult person shall be required and no order or
reference or any home studies need be issued."); see also Jacobs, supra note 59.
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When same-sex couples choose not to marry, however, the
ability to adopt a partner's child will vary by state.6' In some
states, an unmarried partner, gay or straight, is never allowed to
adopt the partner's child.62 In others, courts have allowed same-
sex partners to adopt via a so-called "second-parent adoption," in
which the biological parent and partner jointly petition to adopt
(even though the biological parent is already legally attached to the
child) .63
The first second-parent adoption was granted during an era in
which lesbian couples just began to openly have and raise children.
These "planned lesbian families," as they were then called, coin-
cided with the popularizing of artificial insemination, and a "self-
insemination" movement, in the 1980s.64 Today, the number of gay
and lesbian couples openly raising children has dramatically in-
creased. Nearly 600,000 American households are anchored by a
same-sex couple, and nearly a quarter of them are raising children.
As many as nine million children in the U.S. have at least one gay
parent.65 But long before we reached numbers at those levels, the
lesbian-couple families began to seek ways to cement ties between
the non-biological mother and the children.
In 1993, Vermont and Massachusetts became the first states to
approve adoptions that resulted in recognition of a child with two
legal mothers. In Adoption of Tammy, two successful doctors de-
cided to have and raise a child together.66 The child was conceived
by one of the women, using donor sperm. After the child's birth,
the biological mother and her lesbian partner jointly petitioned to
adopt the child. The applicable adoption statute did not expressly
prohibit an unmarried couple from jointly adopting a child, nor did
61 See, e.g., UTAH CoI)E ANN. § 78B-6-117(3) (West 2015).
62 Id.
63 Mark A. Momijan, Cause of Action for Second-Parent Adoption, 25 CAUSES OF AcrION
2D 1, §1 (Nov. 2015).
64 Nancy Polikoff, Brief Amicus Curiae, R.-Y v. Robin Y., New York County Family Court
Docket No. P3884/91, reprinted in 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 213, 219-20 n. 2
(1996-97) (citing documentation of early lesbian planned families); see also Nan D. Hunter &
Nancy D. Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25
BUFF. L. REV. 691 (1976); Benna F. Armano, Lesbian Mother: Her Right to Child Custody, 4
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1 (1973).
65 See Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents
Matter?, 66 AM. Soc. Rjv. 159, 164-65 (2001); see also Gary J. Gates et al., Adoption and Foster
Care by Gay and Lesbian Parents in the United States, URBAN INSTITUTE (2007), http://www
.urban.org/research/publication/adoption-and-foster-care-lesbian-and-gay-parents-united-states/
view/fullreport.
66 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); see also Doris Sue Wong, Lesbian Couple Allowed to Adopt,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 11, 1993.
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it expressly prohibit adoption by two people of the same sex. 67 But
certainly the legislature did not contemplate what these two wo-
men were proposing. And the statute did say that adoption has the
effect of terminating legal ties between a child and his or her natu-
ral parents. But as to this provision, the court held that it did not
apply to stepparent or second-parent adoptions, where one of the
natural parents is a party to the adoption petition. Moreover, on a
record replete with witnesses-psychologists, teachers, a priest,
and a nun-who testified to the existence of a stable and functional
parent-child relationship between the child and both women, the
court held that the adoption, though unorthodox, would be in the
best interests of the child. The highest court in Vermont reached
the same conclusion in a similar case the same year.68 In the years
that followed, several states adopted statutes explicitly authorizing
second-parent adoptions for same-sex partners of a parent, and ap-
pellate courts in many other states upheld such adoptions without
express statutory authorization. 69 Second-parent adoption became,
in relatively short order, the ideal mechanism for securing rights
between a lesbian co-parent and her partner's child. Legally
speaking, adoption is superior to the alternatives because it is em-
bodied in a judgment, which is entitled to the most exacting form
of full faith and credit and thus valid in other states.7 °
67 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 1 (West 2008). The statute provides that a "person of
full age may petition the probate court ... to adopt as his child another person younger than
himself, unless such other person is his wife or husband, or brother, sister, uncle or aunt, of the
whole or half blood."
68 See Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993) (holding that adoption
does not require termination of the natural mother's parental rights when the adoption is be-
tween the natural mother and her partner and is in the best interests of the children).
69 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(f) (West 2004); COLO. R.v. SrA'r. §§ 9-5-203(1),
19-5-208(5), 19-5-210(1.5), 19-5-211(1.5) (2007); CONN. GrEN. STrAr. ANN. § 45a-724(3) (West
2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (West 2004). On second-parent adoptions generally,
see Jane S. Schacter, Constructing Families in a Democracy: Courts, Legislatures, and Second-
Parent Adoption, 75 Ciii.-KINr L. REV. 933 (2000).
70 V.L. v. E.L. 84 U.S.L.W. 3491 (2016) (per curiam) (requiring Alabama courts to give full
faith and credit to second-parent adoption granted to lesbian couple in Georgia). See Embry v.
Ryan, 11 So. 3d 408, 409-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); see also Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d
1139, 1151 (10th Cir. 2007) (invalidating state constitutional amendment that bars recognition of
final adoption orders from other states by same-sex couples because it violates the Full Faith and
Credit Clause); Russell v. Bridgens, 647 N.W.2d 56, 58-60 (Neb. 2002) (noting that courts must
give full faith and credit to a Pennsylvania same-sex co-parent adoption unless the challenging
party can prove the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction); Starr v. Erez, No. COA99-1534
(N.C. Ct. App., Nov. 27, 2000). A New York court allowed a same-sex couple to jointly adopt
the biological child of one of the partners, even though the co-parent already had enforceable
parental rights because the couple had legally married in the Netherlands. In re Adoption of
Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 692-93 (Sur. Ct. 2009). The court held that "the best interests of
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Legislative and judicial approval of second-parent adoptions
involved two deviations from the traditional model of parentage:
(1) that a child could have two legal mothers, rather than a mother
and a father; and (2) that an unmarried partner could adopt her
partner's child-without severing the ties between the biological
mother and child and without being married to the mother. The
first change is the more significant, one that paved the way for rec-
ognition of parent-child relationships in a variety of new contexts.
Yet it seemed to trouble courts very little. The impulse that two
parents are better than one seemed to drive decision-making more
than concern about exclusivity or the necessity of the traditional
mother/father model. The second change-to allow, in effect, a
stepparent adoption for an unmarried partner-was an equitable
workaround in a world without marriage for same-sex couples.
The idea of a second parent who was not married to the first parent
was no longer novel-we have unwed fathers like Peter Stanley to
thank for that development. But adoption law remains wedded to
the past and the notion that only the stability of marriage would
justify allowing two adults to jointly parent a child. Courts and
legislatures recognized, however, that same-sex couples, without a
right to marry, did not have access to stepparent adoption and thus
created exceptions to the usual rules.7 ' Second-parent adoption
was used as an equitable remedy for the law's denial of equality for
those couples. 72 The question after Obergefell is whether those
states will continue to allow unmarried same-sex couples to use
second-parent adoption to shore up the relationship between the
second parent and the child, or whether those couples will, like
heterosexual couples, be required to marry to avail themselves of
the adoption privilege.
B. Lesbian Co-Parents
It may seem as though we have just finished with the issue of
lesbian co-parents, but adoption is only one of the possible mecha-
this child require a judgment that will ensure recognition of both Ingrid and Mona as his legal
parents throughout the entire United States." Id. An Alabama court recently refused to give
full faith and credit to a second-parent adoption granted in Georgia. The Supreme Court, which
has not yet ruled on the adoptive mother's petition for certiorari, stayed the ruling pending that
decision. See Smith v. E.L., 2015 WL 7258695 (Dec. 14, 2015).
71 See Erin J. Law, Taking a Critical Look at Second Parent Adoption, 8 L. & SEXUALITY
699, 701, 707 (1998).
72 id.
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nisms for recognizing a legal tie between a biological mother's
partner and the mother's child.73 Many states, even a majority, do
not have any precedent for lesbian second-parent adoptions, nor
any clear statutory authority. In North Carolina, the state's highest
court invalidated such an adoption decree in a high-profile case
involving a state legislator, because of the lack of statutory author-
ity, even though thousands of similar adoptions had been granted
by trial courts in the state.74 Some other states have also ruled ex-
pressly against second-parent adoptions by same-sex couples. 75
There have been a huge number of cases in the last two de-
cades involving lesbian co-parents who jointly participated in the
decision to have a child, but later parted ways. 76 If a second-parent
adoption has taken place, there likely is no parentage dispute that
ends up in the courts. Yet there are dozens and dozens of cases in
which the rights of the non-biological co-parent are litigated.
Whether and under what circumstances she has rights or obliga-
tions with respect to her partner's child varies tremendously by ju-
risdiction, as well as by the particular nature of the relationship.77
The range of approaches invites consideration of the many possible
bases for parentage other than the genetic tie-intent, contract,
and function.
In some jurisdictions, the lesbian co-parent can be recognized
as a de facto parent by virtue of the functional parent-child rela-
tionship actively fostered by the biological mother and carried out
73 See generally Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child:
Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J.C.R. &
C.L. 201, 205 (2009).
74 Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
75 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 376-77 (Neb. 2002) (concluding that
Nebraska's adoption statutes prohibit two unmarried persons from adopting a minor child to-
gether); In re Adoption of Adoption of Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1072 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (con-
struing the Ohio adoption statute to permit adoption by an unmarried adult only if the biological
parents' legal rights are terminated; In Interest of Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 685-86 (Wis.
1994) (prohibiting adoption by a mother and her female cohabitant because the proposed adop-
tion failed to satisfy elements of the adoption statute).
76 Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010); In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302 (Ohio
2011).
77 Compare Black v. Simms, 12 So. 3d 1140, 1143 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (rejecting de facto
parentage in light of "the paramount right of a parent in the care, custody, and control of his or
[sic] child" that can be abrogated only "in rare circumstances") and Janice M. v. Margaret K.,
948 A.2d 73, 84-93 (Md. 2008) (finding no justification for elevating de facto parent above other
third parties seeking to obtain custody or visitation over the natural parent's objection), with
Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 925, 930-32 (Del. 2011) (upholding de facto parentage statute
against constitutional challenge and awarding joint custody to adoptive mother and lesbian de
facto parent), and In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176-77 (Wash. 2005) (recognizing de
facto parent status in legal parity with an otherwise legal parent).
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by the co-parent.78 This status seldom results in rights precisely
equal to the biological parent's, but it can be the basis for awarding
visitation rights.79 The Wisconsin Supreme Court was the first to
recognize de facto parentage in a lesbian co-parent. In In re Cus-
tody of H.S.H.-K, the Court relied on this concept to grant visita-
tion to the co-parent over the objection of the child's biological
mother.8 0 The two women were intimately involved and, together,
planned to start a family. From the outset, both women functioned
equally as parents to the child, sharing every burden and participat-
ing in every happy moment. But when the women broke off their
adult relationship four years after the child was born, the biological
mother sought to sever ties completely. As in many states, Wiscon-
sin courts had the authority to adjudicate custody in the wake of
the dissolution of marriage and to place a child with a non-parent
in the event both parents were unfit or unable to care for the child.
But there was no express authorization for what the co-parent
sought-an adjudication of a quasi-parental status that would allow
the mother's wishes to be overridden in favor of a non-parent. The
Court drew on equitable principles to craft a right for the co-parent
based on her functional parent-child relationship. It acknowledged
the constitutional parental rights of the biological mother, but held
that she had, in effect, agreed to their dilution by fostering a paren-
tal-type relationship between her partner and her child. The par-
ent-like relationship is established through four elements: (1)
consent by the biological parent to foster the formation of the par-
ent-child relationship; (2) living in the same household with the
child; (3) assuming the obligations of parenthood, including sup-
port and childrearing; and (4) sufficient duration to establish "with
the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature."'
This four-part test has become the standard definition of de facto
parentage; it has been adopted by courts in some jurisdictions8 2
and by legislatures in others.8 3
78 Emily C. Patt, Second Parent Adoption: When Crossing the Marital Barrier Is in a Child's
Best Interests, 3 BERKEI.EY WOMEN'S L.J. 96, 107 (1987).
79 Sarah H. Ramsey, Constructing Parenthood for Stepparents: Parents By Estoppel and De
Facto Parents Under the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 8
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 285, 292 (2001).
80 In re Custody of H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
81 Id.
82 See, e.g., In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 559-60 (Colo. App. 2004); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759
A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000).
83 See, e.g., DrE. CoiE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-101 (2011) (considering marriage between persons of
the same gender to be void but recognizing children of these marriages as legitimate); see also
Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 925, 930-32 (Del. 2011) (upholding de facto parentage statute
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This doctrine, however, has been rejected by courts in many
states, including in the controversial New York case, Debra H. v.
Janice R.&4 The court in that case cited the lack of certainty about
parental status as the chief reason for rejecting de facto parent-
age-the judges during oral argument said it was better to have a
clear answer on parental status than to have the right answer.
Other courts have voiced concern over the biological mother's con-
stitutionally protected parental rights8 6 or the usurpation of legisla-
tive authority to create, or choose not to create, a quasi-parental
status.87
In other jurisdictions, agreement has played a greater role
than functional parenting in determining lesbian co-parent rights.
In several states, courts have enforced co-parenting agreements, or
at least expressed a willingness to do so in the right case. The Su-
preme Court of Ohio, for example, held in In re Mullen that while
a parent cannot be ordered to share custody or control with a third
party, a parent "may voluntarily share with a nonparent the care,
against constitutional challenge and awarding joint custody to adoptive mother and lesbian de
facto parent). In a recent case, the Wyoming Supreme Court declined to adopt the de facto
parentage doctrine, agreeing with the Delaware court that the legislature should decide whether
to codify the status. See L.P. v. L.F. 338 P.3d 908 (Wyo. 2014). Effective July 1, 2016, the Maine
legislature enacted a de facto parent law. See MAIM, Rrv. STAT. § 1891 (2016).
84 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010); see also Guardianship of Z.C.W. and K.G.W., 84 Cal. Rptr.
2d 48, 49-50 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 2-3 (Del. 2009), superseded by
statute Di.A_ Cori ANN. tit. 13, § 8-101; Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669, 673 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2006); In re C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316, 320-21 (111. App. Ct. 1999); B.F. v. T.D., 194 S.W.3d
310, 312 (Ky. 2006); Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 84-93 (Md. 2008). White v. White,
293 S.W.3d 1,9, 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184,186 (N.Y. 2010);
In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913, 923 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808,
809-10 (Utah 2007); Stadter v. Siperko, 661 S.E.2d 494, 499-501 (Va. Ct. App. 2008); Titchenal v.
Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 683-85 (Vt. 1997).
85 Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 190-92; Jones, 154 P.3d at 816 (declining to adopt de facto par-
entage doctrine because it "fails to provide an identifiable jurisdictional test that may be easily
and uniformly applied in all cases").
86 See, e.g., Black v. Simms, 12 So. 3d 1140, 1143 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (rejecting de facto
parentage in light of "the paramount right of a parent in the care, custody, and control of his or
[sic] child" that can be abrogated only "in rare circumstances"); Janice M., 948 A.2d at 680-95
(finding no justification for elevating de facto parent above other third parties seeking to obtain
custody or visitation over the natural parent's objection); In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d at 918-19;
Jones, 154 P.3d at 819 (refusing to recognize de facto parentage because doing so "would abro-
gate a portion of [the biological mother's] parental rights"); Titchenal, 693 A.2d at 687 (noting
the "potential dangers of forcing parents to defend third-party visitation claims").
87 See, e.g., Z.C.W., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48 at 50-51; Jones, 154 P.3d at 810 ("We decline to
extend the common law doctrine of in loco parentis to create standing where it does not arise by
statute."); Titchenal, 693 A.2d at 689 ("Given the complex social and practical ramifications of
expanding the classes of persons entitled to assert parental rights by seeking custody or visita-
tion, the Legislature is better equipped to deal with the problem.").
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custody, and control of his or her child through a valid shared-
parenting agreement." 8 Other states, including North Carolina
and Kansas, have issued similar rulings.89
Parentage by function or by private agreement can preserve
an informal parent-child relationship, but only if the law allows it
and the facts supporting the claim can be proven.90 These are the
least certain of potential ties between parent and child and the
least likely to be recognized across state lines. But they remain
relevant for lesbian couples who choose not to marry-or for those
whose children were conceived and born before marriage became
legal in their home states. A Maryland court just ruled that a les-
bian co-parent dispute was unaffected by Obergefell because the
child was born before the ruling.91 Whether or not the two women
had the option to marry did not change their status-they were an
unmarried couple who jointly participated in the birth and rearing
of a child and were subject to the rules governing all such
couples.92 The lesbian co-parent in this case, Conover v. Cono-
ver,93 did not succeed in being recognized as a second parent to her
partner's biological child.94 She was deemed a legal stranger whose
access to the child could be unilaterally severed by the child's bio-
logical mother.95
One question after Obergefell is whether de facto parentage
might lose its traction given the ability of same-sex couples to
marry and create formal parent-child ties. A Missouri appellate
court recently observed that "the justification for rejecting an equi-
table parentage argument is stronger today" than in 2009 when it
88 In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302, 305 (Ohio 2011).
89 Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542 (Kan. 2013) (holding that a lesbian co-parent was
entitled to full legal parent status on the basis of a co-parenting agreement signed by her and her
partner that she and her partner had signed in conjunction with the birth of their daughters);
Joanna L. Grossman, Parenthood by Contract: The Kansas Supreme Court Enforces a Lesbian
Co-Parenting Agreement, JusTIA'S ViURDICr (April 16, 2013) https:gIverdict.justia.com/2Ol3/04/
16/parenthood-by-contract.
90 In Mullen, for example, the court found insufficient evidence that the two women had
entered into the agreement alleged by the plaintiff-coparent; see also Christina Spiezia, In the
Courts: State Views on the Psychological-Parent and De Facto-Parent Doctrines, 33 CHILD. LE-
GAL RTs. J. 402, 405-07 (2013); Joanna L. Grossman, The New Illegitimacy: Tying Parentage to
Marital Status for Lesbian Co-Parents, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 671, 678-79
(2012).





95 Id. at 886.
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first rejected the doctrine.96 Indeed, the court noted, "[w]e antici-
pate that in the wake of Obergefell, situations like this one, in
which important issues involving children must be decided outside
the established legal framework applicable to married couples, will
occur less frequently. '97 The New York Court of Appeals, in
Debra H., rejected the de facto parentage doctrine, but granted
parental rights to the lesbian co-parent. While pregnant, Janice R.
had entered into a civil union with Debra H., which, the court con-
cluded, gave rise to parental rights under Vermont's marital pre-
sumption.98 Putting aside the very real possibility that the New
York court misunderstood Vermont law on this point, we see in the
court's ruling a clear preference for tethering parentage to marital
status rather than allowing it to be proven on more amorphous and
fact-specific grounds. It is not a stretch to predict that other courts
will exhibit that same preference now that marriage is available to
same-sex couples in every state. 99
C. The Marital Presumption
Perhaps the purest test of what parentage law looks like when
gender is removed from the equation is the treatment of the mari-
tal presumption. Just over a decade ago, there was no conceivable
way for a lesbian co-parent to gain parentage through marital sta-
tus because there was no marriage or marriage-like alternative for
same-sex couples. But beginning in 2000, with civil unions in Ver-
mont, 1°° and continued in 2004, with the nation's first same-sex
marriages in Massachusetts,'0 1 the possibility of marriage-based
parentage for same-sex couples emerged. Courtesy of the Su-
preme Court's ruling in Obergefell, same-sex couples now have the
opportunity to marry in any state.'0 2
96 McGaw v. McGaw, 468 S.W.3d 435, 442 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015).
97 Id. at 438.
98 Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 197 (N.Y. 2010).
99 See generally Nancy D. Polikoff, The New "Illegitimacy": Winning Backward in the Protec-
tion of the Children of Lesbian Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDE-R SOC. Po>Y & L. 721 (2012);
Grossman, supra note 90.
100 See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that it was a violation of the state
constitution to withhold the benefits of marriage from same-sex couples and giving the legisla-
ture 180 days to conform the law to the constitutional standard); An Act to Create Civil Unions,
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-205 (2000) (partially repealed 2009).
10i See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
102 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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Recall from Section I the traditional marital presumption.
Once conclusive, but now typically rebuttable, husbands are pre-
sumed to have fathered children born to their wives during the
marriage and, therefore, to be their legal parents. Is a woman's
wife also presumed to be the legal parent of any children born to
the woman during the marriage?
10 3
In the states that adopted same-sex marriage or civil union by
statute prior to the mandate in Obergefell, the legislatures made
clear that all the benefits and obligations of marriage are available
to same-sex couples who choose that formal status. One of the
derivatives of marriage that is both right and obligation is a marital
presumption of paternity-husbands are presumed to be the fa-
thers of their wives' offspring. Courts understood the command
for parity to mean that this presumption should be applied to les-
bian couples as well-a female spouse must be presumed to be the
legal parent of her spouse's biological children.1° In some jurisdic-
tions, the legislature adopted specific language to support the gen-
der-neutral application of the marital presumption, even before
they offered full marriage equality rights.10 5 In D.C., for example,
there is a specific statute that outlines how the marital presumption
of maternity should work. Birth during marriage or domestic part-
nership creates a presumption of legal motherhood for the co-par-
ent, which can be rebutted with "clear and convincing evidence
that the presumed parent did not hold herself out as a parent of the
103 For obvious reasons, the traditional marital presumption applied only to husbands. In an
odd recent case, a woman claimed to be the legal mother of a child sired by her husband and
given birth to by his mistress. See In the Interest of S.N.V., 284 P.3d 147 (Colo. App. 2011). But
this was certainly not a typical case-nor one likely to result in a finding of parentage in the
woman who did not give birth to the child.
104 See, e.g., Hunter v. Rose, 975 N.E.2d 857 (Mass. 2012) (holding that child born during
registered domestic partnership was presumed the child of both parties); Miller-Jenkins v.
Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006); see also Wendy G-M. v. Erin G-M., 985 N.Y.S.2d 845
(N.Y. 2014) (holding that lesbian spouse is an equal legal parent of a child conceived with artifi-
cial insemination and born during the marriage); Barse v. Pasternak, 2015 WL 600973 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2015) (holding that child born during civil union that was subsequently converted into
a marriage was legal child of mother's female spouse). For more sustained analysis of this ques-
tion, see Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy
in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. Rr-v. 227 (2006).
105 Vermont's original civil union law provided that the "rights of parties to a civil union, with
respect to a child of whom either becomes the natural parent during the term of the civil union,
shall be the same as those of a married couple, with respect to a child of whom either spouse
becomes the natural parent during the marriage." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1204(f) (2000) (2010)
(partially repealed in 2009); see also CAL. FAM. CoDE § 297.5 (d) (West 2007) ("The rights and
obligations of registered domestic partners with respect to a child of either of them shall be the
same as those of spouses."). Under current California law, all parentage rules are gender-neu-
tral and applied with equal force to all spouses. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2013).
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child."1" In states that came to same-sex marriage solely by virtue
of a judicial mandate (Obergefell, if not one prior to that), we can
assume that the rights and obligations should be equal for same
and opposite-sex couples, but there is no statutory language to
prove it.
The application of the marital presumption of paternity to a
female spouse raises two interesting questions. First, which marital
presumption applies? The general presumption of husband-pater-
nity or the special rule governing conception with assisted repro-
duction? If the former, then what is the nature of the protection?
Most marital presumptions are rebuttable today, some upon proof
of no genetic tie between husband and child, some only if a court
decree establishes paternity in another man. The genetic tie be-
tween child and lesbian co-parent will virtually never exist (outside
the rare care of one spouse providing the egg for gestation by the
other), thus some of these presumptions are of uncertain force. A
trial court in Connecticut recently held that the marital presump-
tion applies with equal force to children born to married same-sex
couples, and, although the presumption can usually be rebutted by
evidence of no genetic tie, the court held that equitable principles
could be invoked to prevent the biological mother from seeking to
rebut the presumption. 0 7 The presumptions that may be rebutted
based on another man's paternity might be more protective since
many of the pregnancies will be achieved with donor sperm under
conditions that result in non-paternity for the donor.
Second, what is the theoretical or policy basis for extending
the marital presumption of paternity to a female spouse? As dis-
cussed earlier, the marital presumption was largely, but not exclu-
sively, driven by a guess about biological fatherhood. And it swept
in cases without a biological tie because it was better to brush evi-
dence of extramarital sex under the rug in an age when both illegit-
imacy and divorce were stigmatized. And even the post-1973
statutes that extended the marital presumption to cases of artificial
insemination with sperm from a donor were designed to create the
appearance of biological fatherhood. None of these rationales sup-
port extension of the presumption to lesbian co-parents. That is
not to say that female spouses should not be treated as legal par-
ents of their partners' children, only that the traditional rationales
often do not apply.
106 D.C. Coim-i § 16-909(a)(1) (2012).
107 Barse, 2015 WL 600973.
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In the context of two women who together plan for the con-
ception and birth of a child, what is marriage a proxy for? It is
certainly not a proxy for biology-our best guess about the identity
of the child's other genetic parent-as it was for married fathers.
So what does marriage stand for here? It seems, for some courts,
to stand as a proxy for consent of the definite legal parent-the
biological mother-to share parental rights. In defending its re-
quirement of a formal legal tie as a prerequisite for parentage, the
Debra H. court observed: "And both civil union and adoption re-
quire the biological or adoptive parent's legal consent, as opposed
to the indeterminate implied consent featured in the various tests
proposed to establish de facto or functional parentage." But con-
sent to what? Is the decision to enter a marriage or civil union
evidence of consent to share parentage of children conceived via
artificial insemination or, at a minimum, with genetic material from
a third party? The "implied consent" of de facto parentage may,
indeed, be "indeterminate"; but it also speaks directly to the rele-
vant question: did the biological mother intend to share her other-
wise absolute parental rights with another adult?
It might also be a proxy for the stability of a family unit-and
the assumption of a social parent-child relationship between the
second adult in the household and the child. In Michael H. v. Ger-
ald D., the Supreme Court upheld California's marital presump-
tion, which allowed the husband's paternity to be rebutted only by
the spouses, and not by the child's biological father seeking to re-
but the presumption in favor of his own rights.10 8 The Court de-
ferred to California's protection of the "marital family" that was
admittedly not based on a genetic tie between husband and child.
This same reasoning might protect a lesbian co-parent against
claims by a third party, perhaps the man who provided the sperm,
but it may not protect her in a dispute with the child's biological
parent.
There are clearly valid reasons to apply the marital presump-
tion to female spouses. First, constitutional principles may require
that female spouses be treated as legal parents if the law treats
husbands as legal parents in cases of artificial insemination with
donor sperm. The Iowa Supreme Court ruled that the Department
of Public Health was constitutionally required to list a mother's
spouse on a child's birth certificate regardless of the spouse's gen-
108 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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der.t0 9 Iowa became a same-sex marriage state by judicial ruling
and thus has no statute prescribing the rules of parentage or other
incidents of marriage. The court held, however, that because the
state code applies the marital presumption to husbands in cases of
artificial insemination with donor sperm, it could not refuse to do
so for a female spouse without running afoul of equal protection
principles. In either case, the spouse's tie to the child was the
same-marriage to the child's mother. And after Obergefell, con-
stitutional principles may require that the marital presumption be
applied to same-sex spouses even if there is no statute on artificial
insemination if the presumption is simply an incident of marriage.
Second, the biological mother's consent to marry is sometimes
treated as consent to share parental rights of any children born
during the union. Recall the ruling in Debra H., in which the New
York Court of Appeals held that marriage to a child's mother is the
only way other than adoption through which a lesbian co-parent
can gain parental status." The court based its ruling squarely on
the notion of consent. While Janice M., the biological mother, had
the power to exclude other adults from her child's life, she gave up
that power by entering into a civil union with Debra H. while preg-
nant and inviting her to assume a parental role.
Third, the extension of the marital presumption to female co-
parents may be justified by the benefit to children of identifying a
second legal parent. For children conceived with sperm from a do-
nor who is likely subject to a statutory rule of non-paternity, the
female co-parent is the only possible second parent. The D.C. pro-
vision mentioned above is designed to award legal parentage to co-
parents who are both committed to the biological parent through
marriage or domestic partnership and have functioned as a parent.
It screens in "real" parents and screens out the rest.
At a minimum, Obergefell will provoke questions about the
applicability of the marital presumption to female spouses, and, as
discussed above, courts are likely to reflexively apply it with equal
force. This is probably the right result, but what the changed land-
scape ought to provoke is a more thoughtful inquiry into the nature
of the marital presumption itself as a basis for parentage. The in-
109 Gartner v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335 (Iowa 2013) (invalidating state
parentage statute, which precluded the listing of two mothers on birth certificate, as unconstitu-
tional on state equal protection grounds). On this case, see Joanna L. Grossman, Birthright: The
Iowa Supreme Court Allows a Lesbian Co-Parent to be Listed on an Infant's Birth Certificate,
JUSTIA'S VERIJICr (May 28, 2013), http://verdict.justia.coin2013/05/28fbirthright-the-iowa-su-
preme-court-allows-a-lesbian-co-parent-to-be-listed-on-an-infants-birth-certificate.
110 Debra H., 930 N.E.2d 184, 195-96 (N.Y. 2010).
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teresting question is not which spouses benefit from, or are subject
to, the presumption, but why?
C. Surrogacy
An increasingly popular type of family creation, surrogacy in-
volves an agreement that one woman will conceive and carry a
child for someone else to raise."' In its traditional form, a woman
conceived a child using her own egg and sperm from the husband
of an infertile woman. The surrogate could be inseminated by a
doctor or at home, and the arrangement was conducted pursuant to
a contract providing that the surrogate was to relinquish all rights
to the child at birth in favor of the intended parents-the biological
father and his wife.112 The legal questions about surrogacy arise
out of contracts that purport to assign parentage to someone other
than the person designated by the traditional rules. Can parentage
be relinquished-and assumed-prior to the birth of a child? Af-
ter birth, the substitution of one set of legal parents for another
would be governed by adoption law, with rules about the revocabil-
ity of consent, screening of the adoptive parent, and so on. But
surrogacy arrangements rely on the enforceability of the agree-
ment, without which the child would never have been brought into
the world, and the inability of the carrier to change her mind. The
well-known Baby M. case brought the emerging issue of surrogacy
into the public consciousness.' 13 There, a traditional surrogate,
who had been paid $10,000 to conceive and gestate a child for an-
other couple, refused to honor the agreement. The case unfolded
dramatically across several states and culminated in a ruling from
the New Jersey Supreme Court that the agreement was void as
against public policy. 14 With the contract deemed unenforceable,
the traditional rules of parentage came into play. The child's legal
parents were her biological mother (the surrogate) and biological
father (the sperm donor and intended father).
111 Amy Garrity, A Comparative Analysis of Surrogacy Law in the United States and Great
Britain-A Proposed Model Statute for Louisiana, 60 LA. L. Ri-v. 809, 809 (2000).
112 See Janice C. Ciccarelli & Linda J. Beckman, Navigating Rough Waters: An Overview of
the Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy, 61 J. Soc. ISSUEs 21 (2005).
113 For a history of this case and its role in the surrogacy debate, see Elizabeth S. Scott,
Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & COr, rNIMP. PROBS. 109 (2009); see also
Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M., 30 HARV. J.L. &
GUNDIn 67 (2007).
114 In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
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The Baby M. ruling had national reverberations, provoking a
public debate, as well as a wide range of legislative responses. To-
day, almost thirty years later, surrogacy remains controversial for
both same-sex and different-sex families, and states remain split
over its legality. 115 There are still many states, including New York,
that prohibit paid surrogacy, and others that have no clear rule."16
Most modern surrogacy arrangements involve gestational surro-
gacy, in which the carrier provides only the womb, not the egg.1 1 7
The egg and sperm will come either from the intended parents,
from donors, or a combination of the two."' This type of surro-
gacy abates one strand of objection, about the difficulty a biologi-
cal mother might have parting with her newborn, but leaves others
in play.119
An increasing number of states, however, regulate surrogacy
by statute.1 20  In those states, gestational surrogacy is permitted,
but only within certain parameters.121 This shift reflects a growing
awareness of the need for surrogacy: it provides a way for infertile
115 Compare In re the Paternity of F.T.R, 833 N.W.2d 634 (Wis. 2013) (holding the surrogacy
agreement entered by the parties as valid and enforceable contract), and In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d
807 (Tenn. 2014) (holding traditional surrogacy agreements as enforceable under strict guide-
lines), with Baby M., 537 A.2d at 1227 (finding that surrogacy agreements were unenforceable
and a violation of NJ public policy), and R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998) (holding that
surrogacy agreement between the surrogate mother and father was unenforceable). The Uni-
form Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, promulgated in 1988, offered alternative
provisions on surrogacy: one banning such arrangements, one allowing them. USCACA secs. 5,
10, 9C U.L.A. 363 (2001). The Uniform Parentage Act, which supersedes the USCACA, rejects
this approach, opting instead for an approach that allows, but regulates surrogacy. See U.P.A
§ 801 & cmt. (2002).
116 See N.Y. DOM. RFi. § 123 (McKinney 1993) (prohibiting compensated surrogacy); see
also Scott, supra note 113; Tamar Lewin, Coming to U.S. for Baby, and Womb to Carry It, N.Y.
TIMI.S, July 6, 2014 at Al. Many bills have been introduced into the New York legislature to
repeal the surrogacy ban, the latest in 2015. See 2015 N.Y. S.B. 2675, 2015 Leg., 238th Sess.
(N.Y. 2015). Paid surrogacy is also banned by statute in Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Michi-
gan, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, and the District of Columbia. See Center for Bioethics
and Culture, State-by-State Surrogacy Summary, CBC (Aug. 2012), http://www.cbc-network.org/
wp-content/uploads/2012/08/State-by-StateSurrogacySumCBC.pdf.
117 Christen Blackburn, Family Law-Who is a Mother? Determining Legal Maternity in Sur-
rogacy Arrangements in Tennessee, 39 U. MEM. L. Rizv. 349, 352 (2009).
118 Id.
119 Although gestational surrogacy has generally met with more acceptance than traditional
surrogacy, a New Jersey court held in 2009 that Baby M. applied with equal force to gestational
surrogacy arrangements, thus preventing their enforcement. See A.G.R. v. D.R.H., Docket No.
FD-09-001838-07, (N.J. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 2009) 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3250.
120 The Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act is a model for these types of statutes. See 750 Ill.
Comp. Stat. Ann. 47/5 (2005) [hereinafter "Ill. Comp. Stat."); see also Garrity, supra note 111, at
812-13.
121 II1. Comp. State, supra note 120; Garrity, supra note 111, at 812-13.
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or gay male couples to have children with genetic ties to at least
one parent.122 Perhaps it also reflects an awareness of law's limits.
Laws banning surrogacy seem only to push parties to enter into
arrangements somewhere else, rather than deterring them from us-
ing surrogacy as a means to parenthood. Noel Keane, the interme-
diary who brought together Mary Beth Whitehead and the Sterns,
had the same number of surrogacy clients a year after paid surro-
gacy was banned in New Jersey, almost all of whom lived in New
Jersey. 123 The demand for surrogacy is there; along with growing
sympathy for those who see it as their only path to parenthood. 24
In several of the states regulating surrogacy by statute, only a
married couple can enter into an agreement with a gestational car-
rier to produce a child.' 25 In those states, none of which voluntarily
permitted same-sex couples to marry prior to Obergefell,126 same-
sex couples could not jointly enter into a surrogacy arrangement
and the ability of the partner without a biological tie to become a
legal parent would turn on the state's recognition of second-parent
adoption for same-sex couples (discussed above). These obstacles
were most important for gay male couples, who account for an in-
creasing proportion of surrogacy arrangements and who have lim-
ited options for biological parenthood. After Obergefell, however,
different-sex and same-sex couples stand on equal footing-if they
want to become parents via surrogacy in some states, they must
122 On surrogacy and gay male couples, see Arlene Istar Lev, Gay Dads: Choosing Surrogacy,
7 LESBIAN & GAY PSYCHOL. REV. 72 (2006); see also Darren Rosenblum, et al., Pregnant Man?
A Conversation, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207 (2010) (sharing his own story of becoming a
parent, with his male partner, via surrogacy); DAN SAVAGE, THE KID: WHAT HAPPENED AFTER
My BOYFRIEND AND I DECIDED TO GO GET PREGNANT (1999) (recounting the complications of
parenthood via surrogacy for the author and his male partner).
123 Robert Hanley, Jersey Panel Backs Limits on Unpaid Surrogacy Pacts, N.Y. TIMFs, Mar.
12, 1989, at page 38.
124 Precise numbers are hard to find, given the lack of government regulation of surrogacy.
But the American Society for Reproductive Medicine estimated that there were as many as 600
births a year to gestational surrogates between 2003 and 2007. See Sara Rimer, No Stork In-
volved, but Mom and Dad Had Help, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2009, at Al.
125 See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 742.11-16 (West 2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102 (West 2015);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754 (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78b-15-801--09 (West 2015);
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (West 2015); see also Tiffany L. Palmer, The Winding Road to the
Two-Dad Family: Issues Arising in Interstate Surrogacy for Gay Couples, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB.
Po 'Y. 895, 905 (2011). Nevada had a marriage requirement for intended parents, see NEV. REV.
STATI. ANN. § 126.045, but repealed it in 2013.
126 Prior to Obergefell, several of these states were subject to federal court orders invalidating
their state bans on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.
2014) (invalidating Utah's ban on marriage by same-sex couples on constitutional grounds);
Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014) (invalidating same-sex marriage bans in Idaho and
Nevada).
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marry first, but at least they can marry. For some couples, then,
the move to marriage equality might drastically change their indi-
vidual parenting options. But because surrogacy was controversial
long before it was openly used by same-sex couples-and contin-
ues to be separate and apart from any anti-gay-parenting senti-
ment-Obergefell is not likely to have a broader impact on
surrogacy law.
D. Gamete Donation
The parentage rules when conception involves at least one
gamete donor are varied and complex, but revolve around how to
distinguish a donor from a parent. The use of donor sperm in con-
ception did not become a routine practice until the 1950s, and the
use of donor eggs not for several more decades. By the time the
Uniform Parentage Act was first adopted in 1973, artificial insemi-
nation was enough in use-primarily by married women with infer-
tile husbands-that the Act included a parentage provision.
Contemplating only artificial insemination by married women, sec-
tion 5(b) provided that "the donor of semen provided to a licensed
physician for use in artificial insemination of a married woman
other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the
natural father of a child thereby conceived."' 2 7 This was paired
with a provision, section 5(a), that provided that the husband of a
married woman was considered the natural father of any child she
conceived with donor sperm as long as he consented in writing to
the insemination. Together, these provisions operated to substitute
the husband for the donor as the legal father of a donor-conceived
child, and intent for biology.128 This provision was thought neces-
sary in part because a few courts, in the absence of statutory gui-
dance, had held that insemination with donor sperm was adultery
and resulting children were illegitimate. 129 Moreover, as the tradi-
tional marital presumption weakened-becoming rebuttable rather
than conclusive in most jurisdictions-it became less clear that a
woman's husband would be legally tied to her children if he were
not also the biological father.
127 U.P.A. § 5(b) (1973).
128 Id. at § 5(a).
129 See, e.g., Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (I1. Super. Ct., Dec. 13, 1954); appeal
dismissed on procedural grounds, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956).
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In 2000, a new version of the UPA was promulgated. Section
702 of the new act provided that a "donor is not a parent of a child
conceived by means of assisted reproduction. ' 130 It dropped the
requirement that sperm be provided to a licensed physician, thus
extending the non-paternity rule to a greater number of concep-
tions. Sections 703 & 704 provided, as did the original UPA, that a
husband who consents to use of donor sperm by his wife is the
father of any resulting child.' 3' An amendment in 2002 added the
possibility that an unmarried male partner could be deemed the
legal father of a child conceived by his female partner with donor
sperm. Section 703, which previously spoke only of husbands, now
provides that "[a] man who provides sperm for, or consents to, as-
sisted reproduction by a woman as provided in section 704 with the
intent to be the parent of her child, is a parent of the resulting
child. "132
In this iteration, the UPA shifted the line between donors and
potential fathers again, but not in a linear direction. It began to
focus on pre-conception intent as the touchstone for distinguishing
between the two groups rather than biology, the formality of the
medical process, or marital status. Across the nation, states still
vary significantly in their treatment of parentage in the context of
sperm donation. Three-quarters of the states have a statute that
applies a rule of non-paternity in at least some situations. Some
are still based on the original 1973 UPA, some have been amended
to reflect the 2000 or 2002 changes, and some are sui generis. Sev-
eral statutes, for example, provide that a man who donates sperm
to an unmarried woman is not a father unless he and the woman
agreed otherwise in writing before the birth.
33
In which situations is Obergefell likely to make a difference in
parentage determinations involving gamete donors? Its chief ef-
fect will be the ability of a same-sex spouse to take advantage of
the rules regarding artificial insemination within marriage. When a
married woman conceives a child using donor sperm, her husband,
in most states, is deemed the legal father as long as he consented to
the insemination or in vitro fertilization. 34 This rule both cements
130 U.P.A. § 702 (2000).
131 Id. at §§ 703, 704.
132 U.P.A. § 703 (2000, amended 2002).
133 KAN. S'AT. ANN. § 23-2208 (West 2015) ("The donor of semen provided to a licensed
physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is treated in
law as if he were not the birth father of a child thereby conceived, unless agreed to in writing by
the donor and the woman."); CM.. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2015).
134 People v. Sorenson, 437 P.2d 495 (Cal. 1968); U.P.A. § 5(a) (1973).
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the tie between husband and child and provides a protective shield
against claims by donors. After Obergefell, lesbian married
couples should be able to take advantage of the same rule of legal
parentage, provided the spouse consents to conception, as dis-
cussed above. Given that such a statute reflects the state's deter-
mination that biology is not a necessary prerequisite to parentage,
the state would have no constitutional basis for withholding the
benefit of the presumption based solely on the gender of the
spouse.
What about in states without a specific rule regarding assisted
reproduction? A female spouse might be able to avail herself of
the marital presumption, also explained above, which deems a mar-
ried woman's spouse the legal parent of any child to which she
gives birth.1 35 This conclusion assumes that courts will apply the
marital presumption with equal force to same-sex couples, an as-
sumption that will be proven or disproven over time. But where it
does apply, lesbian married couples will have substantially greater
protection against parental rights claims by a known donor, partic-
ularly as long as states restrict a child to two legal parents.
When an unmarried woman conceives a child using donor
sperm, the child may have no legal father (if the donor is subject to
a rule of non-paternity). Practically speaking, anonymous donors
could not have rights or obligations because their identity is un-
known. Known donors could, conceivably, but a majority of states
apply the rule of non-parentage to all donors, regardless of any
current or past connection to the mother. 136 Obergefell has no ob-
vious impact on these rules, but, rather, draws attention to the fact
that parentage rules involving gamete donors have already moved
away from a model that revolves around marriage. The social
changes that brought about this shift continue unabated; there is
thus no reason to expect any reversion to the traditional rules sim-
ply because marriage is now available to same-sex couples.
135 Elizabeth Brenner, Marriage for All: The Legal Impact of Obergefell v. Hodges in Texas,
78 Tf-x. B. J. 622, 622 (2015); see also In re Adoption of a Minor, 29 N.E.3d 830 (Mass. 2015).
136 See, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that the
non-paternity rule applies to known donors, even those who had a prior sexual relationship with
the mother); In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1989) ("an unmarried woman does not lose the
protection of the artificial insemination statute merely because she knows the donor");
Lamaritata v. Lucas, 823 So.2d 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (applying non-paternity rule to
known donor and refusing to enforce post-birth stipulations and agreements purporting to give
him visitation rights); see also Susan Frelich Appleton, Between the Binaries: Exploring the Legal
Boundaries of Nonanonymous Sperm Donation, 49 FAM. L.Q. 93 (2015).
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V. CONCLUSION
Children have always taken center stage in the debates over
same-sex marriage. Potential harm to children was the centerpiece
of the argument by opponents; the desire for legitimacy and a sta-
ble upbringing was at the heart of the argument by proponents.
And, in the end, the Supreme Court decided that the interests of
children militated in favor of same-sex marriage rather than against
it. But the question taken up in this essay is different: in what way
does the changed world of marriage change the world of parent-
age? Or, to ask the same thing a slightly different way, is it harder
or easier now to create, avoid, or gain legal recognition for the ties
that bind parents to children? As the essay has shown, there are
discrete cases-surrogacy, for example-where the impact of
Obergefell is clear. Some couples that were unable to enter en-
forceable surrogacy arrangements will now be able to pursue surro-
gacy as a path to parenthood. But in others, the impact of
Obergefell is less clear and, indeed, reveals the underlying incoher-
ence of parentage law for all families. Open questions about the
applicability of the marital presumption to same-sex spouses loom
large in this category. But the questions do not arise from any par-
ticular complication of same-sex marriage, but rather from our col-
lective failure to provide modern rationales for old rules or to
scrutinize the analogies we draw. Obergefell's most important con-
tribution to parentage law may be simply to provoke the scrutiny
we should already have given it.
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